By light Cav i meant Cavaleiros Viloes:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41167395?seq=1
or a Jinete (no, not a berber unit, unfortunately AoS2 has that one very wrong)
"In regards to the art of war of the Portuguese, as they had to undertake a
restricted occupation of the territory, very soon they adapted themselves to
the kind of war carried out in Morocco, as this was very similar to the one
practiced in Iberia, during the Reconquista. In fact, throughout this period,
the land warfare developed by the Portuguese in Northern Africa will be
defined by the Portuguese chroniclers as the âwar foughtâ (guerra guerreada;
torna fuye). At the end, it was, as JoĂŁo Gouveia Monteiro who points out, "the
medieval variant of the âguerrillaâ, this age-old way of war still commonly
practiced by the so-called primitive peoples, based on armed actions that imply
non-reciprocity and are related to surprise attacks and âsleights of handâ ".
Fought to avoid the enormous risks arising from the great camp battles, but
carried out with sufficient military potential to cause significant damage to
the enemy on several fronts, it was here the most usual way of warfare, together
with the siege war - both offensive and defensive siege manoeuvres - and the
example of what had already happened in Iberia during the Reconquista. In
fact, it will be necessary to get to the 16th century, the year of 1514, to come upon the first pitched battle in Moroccan territory between the Portuguese and
Moroccan armies40
.
The garrisons of the Portuguese strongholds besides their defensive
functions, tried to establish a âno manâs landâ around the fortresses by means of
highly destructive and intimidating warfare actions. The permanent condition
of endemic war, resulting from a number of âcavalcadesâ, âsurprise attacksâ
and âraidsâ within Muslim territory (military expeditions not always easy to
distinguish; they mostly concerned the social status of the participants and
the purpose of these actions). It also resulted from the Portuguese noble menâs
need to perform great feats in order to obtain more âhonour and wealthâ for
their families, obtained not only from loots and captures but mainly from the
granting of favours by the King.
In fact, it was a way of making war through sudden attacks carried out
by the cavalry, where the surprise element was prevalent. The ambushes and
traps were part of this warfare, the âtorna fuyeâ being a frequently used tactic of
combat and very similar to the one used by the light cavalry in Iberia. It
consisted of simulating an attack on the enemyâs forces with a small body of
cavalrymen in order to lure them to a place where the bulk of the Portuguese
cavalry remained hidden; the soldiers attacked without warning and devastated
the enemy.
The action of the crossbowmen was also very important as constitutive
elements of the innumerable cavalcades, entries (entradas) and raids that
marked the first half of the 15th century. In fact, throughout this period, the
crossbowmen equipped with cranequin and stirrup crossbows, as they were
lighter and easier to prepare41, were included in most military expeditions
carried out on Moor soil, and their number varied according to the number
of horses. They restrained the counter-attacks of the enemy after the attacks
by the Portuguese cavalry equipped with spears and swords, or during the
retreats, while helping defend their captures.
Exceptionally, their number amounted to several hundreds, as occurred
in 1416, in an ambush set by the Moors near Ceuta. Then D. Pedro de Meneses
mobilized most of his soldiers to help the cavalry that was retreating, while
positioning them between the fortress and the location of the ambush. He
ordered the soldiers "to shoot alternately in order to put the Moors always
under fire"42. D. Duarte de Meneses, his son, would later adopt and improve
this tactical manoeuvre on the numerous cavalry charges and âentriesâ onto
Moor territories; his peers praised him on the way he organised "his troops
of crossbowmen"43. The crossbowmen were therefore an excellent support
to the cavalry and the foot soldiers for their guerrilla actions, characterised
by their speed and violence wherever the surprise element was fundamental.
Equally common were the âentriesâ and surprise attacks onto enemy
camp, followed by raids on farms and houses and the capture of people in order
to lower their morale and to cause economic damage on them, as well as the
loss of human lives. The Portuguese learned with the local people how to carry
out a mobile war; they were forced to lighten up their cavalry, initially very
heavy for the climate and the physical geography of Northern Africa. They
started using Spanish horses (light horses), almost exclusively, as they were
much more fit to raids and ambushes. Later on, this feature would also be
very important in India, mainly in Goa, Bassein and Daman, where their light
horses became extremely efficient.
The captains of the strongholds, or some noblemen appointed by them,
conducted these operations, and the commanding officers helped them
reconnoitre the land. The military expeditions included several men armed with
spears or swords (the noblemen), as well as equestrians using a crossbow or
a firearm, and the foot soldiers; with the exception of the noble men, the
guide (adail) conducted them. The most important military operations were
sometimes extended to many leagues; this fact afforded more pillages as
well as greater risks. In this instance, some cavalrymen and crossbowmen
that had remained in the fortress supported them during their retreat, waiting
for them on previously appointed places. When they were inside the fortress,
they divided the booty.
Equally important were the âmaritime assaultsâ (saltos) launched onto
the coastal settlements, not only for the frequency they were inflicted but also
because they allowed the widening of the scope of their troops. These attacks
were amphibian military operations that transported the infantry soldiers by
boat, and disembarked them at night in solitary places near their intended
target. There, they remained ambushed until daybreak; at that time, they
hurled themselves over the enemy forces to avoid the retreat of the villagers,
in order to make as many prisoners as they could. Afterwards, the soldiers
ran away transporting their plundering to the ship, thus avoiding the
confrontation with occasional reinforcements of the local people.
As mentioned before, this kind of amphibian operations along the North
African coast, as well as the successive episodes of the siege and attack on
the Muslim strongholds, would later on become extraordinary important on
the Eastern seas, especially for the establishment and consolidation of the
Portuguese presence. These operations supported many of their military
triumphs and contributed decisively for a quick establishment of the fortressesâ
network that, operating in articulation with their fleet, were the basis of the
âEstado da Indiaâ.
The Moroccan fortresses were, throughout this period, a training field
where the Portuguese soldiers practised and improved their knowledge on
the defence of the fortresses. There, they made contact with the technology and
the technique of siege combat, a characteristic of the Arabic war where the
mining and countermining techniques were very important; this fact would
be very useful in the Far East when, once more, the Portuguese had to confront the Muslim armies, especially the Turkish.
In regards to the besieging war, the Portuguese developed a more accurate
technique of organizing their camping ground44 and using the offensive system
of stands45, mobile towers and elevated platforms; they also developed the
efficiency of their field gunpowder artillery with more and better cannons
and gunners46. It allowed them to successfully confront the Moroccan forces
throughout approximately one century and gave them a significant advantage
over other countries, when they arrived at the Indian Ocean."
Portuguese Art of War Northern Morocco during the 15th century
By Vitor Rodrigues
